



**PragueMUN2019**  
**3<sup>rd</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> February**

# **STUDY GUIDE**

## **UNSC**

**(United Nations Security Council)**

*It's time to be UNique!*



Prague, February 2019  
Prague Model United Nations Conference

**Model United Nations Prague z.s.**  
Jaurisova 515/4  
140 00 Prague 4  
The Czech Republic

**Web:** [www.praguemun.cz](http://www.praguemun.cz)

**Authors:** Teja Dobnik and Diego Zermeño Sánchez  
**Graphic Design:** Anna Grybova

# Contents

---

Welcome Letter .....	2
Introduction to the UNSC.....	3
<b>Topic: The Kurdish issue in Iraq .....</b>	<b>5</b>
Introduction to the topic.....	5
Historical Background .....	7
Current Situation.....	12
Bloc Perspectives .....	15
Questions to be Answered by the Committee.....	17
Further reading.....	19
Sources.....	21

# Welcome Letter

---

Dear Delegate,

We would like to welcome you to the PragueMUN 2019's Security Council. We are both very excited to have you in the committee and are looking forward to see you perform. This year's edition of the conference prepared something special for you – a crisis scenario, which will stir the debate and show you a specific view on the issue of the Iraqi Kurdistan. Given the fact that the committee you have been chosen for is one of the advanced councils, we have high hopes for the debate. But worry not, as much as we believe you are a strong and independent delegate, we will help you out and give advice if needed.

The issue we are going to address is a very salient one and requires in depth research not only of your country policies, but also into the issue of the Iraqi Kurdistan itself. A problem of a nation, that lives in more than 4 different countries and is unable to obtain its statehood, poses a great challenge to global policy makers. In order to understand it, this study guide will provide you with the key information that should serve as your guiding points, however your analysis of the issue should not stop there.

Should you have any doubts or questions of this study guide, the committee mechanics, or the conference itself, feel free to contact us by the following email: [unsc2019@praguemun.cz](mailto:unsc2019@praguemun.cz) and we'll get back at you as soon as we can. Should all be clear, we can't wait to meet you all in Prague.

Kind regards,

Teja Dobnik and Diego Zermeño

Chairpersons of the UNSC

# Introduction to the UNSC

---

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six main organs of the UN as established by the United Nations Charter. Its primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security, yet other purposes of the committee range from developing friendly relations among nations and cooperation in solving international problems to promoting respect for human rights and being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations (UNSC, b. d.a). The Security Council has the authority to set forth principles for an agreement between the parties to the dispute, to undertake investigation, to dispatch a mission, to appoint special envoys, issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of conflict, sending military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish *de facto* terms in which peaceful settlements may be sought, establish economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans, collective military action, etc. (UN SC, b. d.b).

Under the Charter, all Member States are compelled to follow and enforce Council decisions (UN SC, b. d.a). ‘‘While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter’’ (*ibidem*).

It consists of 15 members, the Permanent Five (the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation), who were the victors of World War II and non-permanent members, who are elected on a regional basis to serve a two-year term. The presidency has a monthly rotation. Depending on the situation of the conflict, other countries involved can be invited to the sessions as observer states, in order to share their views and actively.

The Permanent Five (also dubbed P5) have the exclusive right of using veto on substantive matters. The majority of controversies surrounding this right have arisen due to certain countries continuously blocking certain issues to even become a part of the agenda. Other controversies come from its structure – three of the P5 members are European, 4 of them are predominantly white and there are no African or Latin American countries included in this clique. Calls for reforms have been growing in volume in the last decades – with proposals of increasing the number of permanent members to the enlargement of the non-permanent member states seats (and Council seats overall).

# Topic: The Kurdish issue in Iraq

## *Introduction to the topic*

The Kurds, a predominantly Sunni Muslim ethnic group who are neither Arabs nor Iranians (Persians), live in “a compact area that reaches from Syria in the west to Iran in the east and Iraq in the south, north through Turkey, and into the states of the former Soviet Caucasus” (BBC, 2018) (Gabbay, 2014, p. 12). These are the areas that form the region known or called as Kurdistan (Land of the Kurds). The Kurdish minority in Iraq is estimated to number more than 6 million people and make up between 17% and 20% of the general population (*ibidem*). The Kurds are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, however they were never able to obtain permanent nation state (BBC, 2017a). The disputed areas of the Iraqi Kurdistan are defined as areas outside of the governorates of Duhok (Dahuk), Erbil (Arbil), and Sulaimaniyah (Sulaimania), with Erbil as its capital (Frantzman, 2016, p. 15).




Figure 1. Iraqi Kurdistan (2017)

Source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iraqelection2010/2010/02/2010228850791212.html>

The Kurds have a distinct historical and ethnic identity, because of which they have been the victims of poor treatment at the hands of central governments in Baghdad. Politics aside, the economic issue - the control of the oil fields - is another reason for the tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, meaning that “part of the issue driving self-determination is the question of who is owed help and who has right to claim a share of resources”(Gvosdev, 2017).

The Iraqi constitution from 2005 Constitution recognises an autonomous Kurdistan region in the north of the country, run by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (BBCa, 2018). Due to increasing political and economic tensions and especially the importance of Kurdistan’s armed forces’ (Peshmerga) role in fighting ISIL, the Kurds started the mission of acquiring their own statehood. In June 2017, Kurdistans political parties decided that an independence referendum would be held on the 25<sup>th</sup> of September, 2017 (BBC, 2017b). In complete disregard of Iraqi outrage and the opposition of the international community, the KRG still held the referendum - 2,861,000 people voted "yes" to independence and 224,000 voted "no. Turnout was 72.61% among those eligible to vote. This resulted in Baghdad moving to assert its authority and imposing punitive measures while at the same time putting the relationship between the Iraqi Kurds and USA at stake (BBC, 2017a).

However, the overwhelming support for independence during the Kurdish referendum does not mean that Kurds automatically have the right to separate from Iraq and form their own independent state. Gvosdev (2017) presents self-determination and territorial integrity as binary opposites - one may have one but not the other, therefore if the Kurds want to assert their democratic right of self-determination, this can only lead to their secession from the state of Iraq (Gvosdev, 2017). Understanding the concepts of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination is crucial. Territorial integrity is “the principle under international law that nation-states should not attempt to promote secessionist movements or to

promote border changes in other nation-states, nor impose a border change through the use of force” (CSCE, b. d.). Self-determination is “a principle of international law which posits that specific groups called ‘peoples’ have the right to auto-determine their political fate. The right to self-determination entails self-governance for peoples and the idea that every people should have a government representative of its interests.” (Sterio, 2017). While international law recognizes the right to self-determination, it does not contain a norm on secession, meaning that no peoples or other minority group can claim any right whatsoever to secede (*ibidem*). This means that with the possible exception of Iraqi Kurdistan, it is very unlikely for Kurds to obtain their own statehood. The main reason for that is the fact that Kurdistan is a territory divided between already existing states – Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. To create an independent Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of these pre-existing states (Gunter, 2004, p. 106) and no state would support its own potential breakup (*ibidem*).

## ***Historical Background***

The Kurds are an ancient people whose history reaches back roughly 2,500 years to the times of the Medes Empire in the 6th century BCE until it was invaded and became a part of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 16th century (Gabbay, 2014, p. 12). After the collapse of the Empire after World War I, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), divided Kurdistan (excluding the area of Kurdistan ruled by Persia in present day Iran), among Turkey, Iraq and Syria (*ibidem*).

### **1960 – 1990: The Kurdish Revolts and the “al-Anfal” Campaign**

From the 1960s on, there have been numerous revolts in different parts of the Greater Kurdistan where all - the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi Kurds have risen against their central governments. In 1961, the Iraqi Kurds, started an uprising against the Arab government in

Baghdad (*ibidem*). The revolt was crushed by the Arab Iraqi forces, however the fighting between the two sides continued. This was followed by a process of Arabisation of villages around Kirkuk in 1963 (KRG, b. d.). During the 1970s and 1980s, the mistreatment of the Kurdish population resulted in deportation and disappearances of Feyli Kurds (*ibidem*). In 1974, the economic issue regarding the possession and control over the Kirkuk province, which encompasses large reserves of oil, escalated into another Kurdish rebellion, which was crushed by the Baghdad government. (Gabbay, 2014, p. 12). The violence continued into 1983, when 8000 male Barzanis were murdered and reached its peak in the al-Anfal Campaign in 1988, which included the use of chemical gas warfare (KRG, b. d.) (Gabbay, 2014, p. 13). Hundreds of thousands of people perished and many live with severe health problems today. At the same time, 4,500 villages were razed to the ground between 1976 and 1988 because of Bagdad undermining the potential of Iraqi Kurdistan's agricultural resources (KRG, b. d.). It resulted in destroying Kurdistan's rural way of life and heritage (*ibidem*).

### **1990 – 2003 – The aftermath of the Gulf Wars and the USA-Allies**

The slaughter of Kurds continued into the 1990s, when the Hussein regime targeted them after they rose against him at the end of the first Gulf War (Gabbay, 2015, p. 13). The political instability during and after the Gulf Wars gave the Kurds an opportunity to start forming their own autonomous part of Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War Kurdish forces were able to establish themselves along what was called the “green line” which included areas in Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh governorates (Frantzman, 2016, p. 15). A *de facto* Kurdish state was then established in northern Iraq in 1991 (Gunther, 2004, p. 108), which was protected by the U.S. no-fly zone from Iraqi invasion and economically supported by the Kurds living within (*ibidem*). It received 13 percent of the Iraqi money from oil sales allowed by the United Nations until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (*ibidem*).

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, U.S president George W. Bush targeted Saddam Hussein's Iraq as part of his "Axis of Terror", encouraging them to start finding options of military strategy should an invasion occur. To this, Turkey refused to allow the USA "to use its territory as a base for a northern front to attack Iraq in March 2003" (*ibidem*), opening the opportunity to the Kurds to become "more critical partners, working alongside American forces in the capture of key northern towns" (Barkley and Laipson, 2005, p. 67). Support from the Kurdish population for the United States has meant that Kurdish areas have been largely exempt from the violence, and Washington has relied on the Peshmerga forces to maintain security there (*ibidem*). "In many counterinsurgency actions, Kurdish forces have served on the frontline, often earning the enmity of the Sunnis, especially in places such as Mosul and Fallujah." (*ibidem*).

This unique political situation however did not bring peace to Iraqi Kurdistan. The two main Iraqi Kurdish parties – the Barzani family's Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) and the Talabani family's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – engaged in a civil war from 1994 to 1998. Even though the conflict simmered later on, the two sides never really united or collaborated again for more than a decade.

### **2005 and Onwards: Fighting ISIS and Increasing Presence in Iraqi Affairs**

With the 2005 Iraqi constitution giving a status of an autonomous region to the Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani of the KDP was elected the president of Kurdistan. In January 2005, Iraqi Kurds voted in regional elections, choosing the president and parliament of the Kurdish Regional Government. Already then, when volunteers asked them informally on the question of independence, 95 percent responded that they favoured it (Barkley and Laipson, 2005, p. 69). In October 2005, Barzani was received by the White House in his capacity as

president of the Kurdish Regional Government, reassuring the Kurds of their special status for American leaders (*ibidem*).

By 2006, the Peshmerga had moved into disputed areas in Sinjar, Kirkuk and Nineveh (Frantzman, 2016, p. 15). This would leave a precedent for the KRG's *de facto* borders, as they would look very similar even 10 years later, with claims on those areas and even sections of territory around Rabia, near the Syrian border (*ibidem*). In 2007, the KRG first took over responsibility for security in the three Kurdish provinces from the US forces (BBC, 2017b) and then wanted to hold a referendum on whether the province of Kirkuk should become part of Iraqi Kurdistan, yet it was delayed indefinitely (*ibidem*). To understand how these claims were not contested more emphatically, Frantzman (2016) notes that "the success of the "surge," the U.S. offensive in 2007 to root out insurgents, and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces had left the KRG on its own as a center of stability in a country lurching from crisis to crisis", therefore leaving Iraqi Kurdistan as a coalition bulwark during the Iraq War (Frantzman, 2016, p. 12).

After the end of Saddam's regime, Kurdish politicians were members of Baghdad governments, while the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) became a federal unit with increased autonomy (Özpek, 2012, p. 37). The tides have changed after the withdrawal of the US forces at the end of 2011. With their allies now gone and with Iraq wanting to become its own nationalist state, "the Baghdad government, headed by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, the leader of the Shiite State of Law Coalition, tried to centralize power" (*ibidem*). This policy only inflamed Kurdish passions for secession, since remaining a part of Iraq became less and less important, especially after the government in Baghdad excluded ethnic and religious groups from the political system. (*ibidem*)

The two Kurdish parties – PUK and KDP have been controlling most economic activity and communication networks as well as the Peshmerga, which is used to both defend their territory and impose order (Barkley and Laipson, 2005, p. 70). Having patched up their differences since their struggles in the mid 1990s, the PUK and KDP have done an effective job of providing for their constituents and have been competing in the political arena over the modalities of sharing power in the regional parliament since 2005 (*ibidem*).

The new challenge for Iraqi Kurds was the arrival of IS at the borders of the Kurdish region in June of 2014, which postponed internal problems that were bubbling to the surface and hindered the advances in the region. The political process has been frozen since due to the war, the elections in Kurdistan were postponed, and hundreds of thousands joined Peshmerga in fighting the IS, “after a brief existential crisis that saw the extremists on the doorstep of Erbil and Duhok” (Frantzman, 2016, p. 12). The leading Kurdish factions of the KDP, PUK and the Gorran Movement united to fight the extremist group. The same happened when KDP set aside its antipathy toward the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and fought their common enemy in places like Mount Sinjar together with the PKK (*ibidem*). Iraqi Kurdistan received recognition of their success by the foreign governments, which was shown “by providing clandestine and official military aid, including direct support for the Peshmerga from the USA” (*ibidem*). Since Iraqi Kurdistan became cut off from Baghdad, it started relying on Turkey as an economic lifeline and it sought to sell its own oil (*ibidem*). By fall of 2016, the Kurdish Peshmerga had successfully conquered tens of vast territories outside of the official borders of the KRG in areas previously described as “disputed” between the KRG and the Iraqi central government (*ibidem*).

## *Current Situation*

Iraqi Kurdistan's territorial integrity and questions of self-determination have historically remained tied to the freedoms gained and flexibilities gained by Baghdad. Due to this, passions were stoked in the last years on the power exercised by the autonomous region on the rest of the country, giving the impression independence was not only feasible, but simple. The region has been called "an example" and a "role model" for what Iraq could be transformed into, both in security and in economic performance (Avraham, 2018).

### **The 2017 Referendum and its Consequences**

Following the build-up of ISIS territorial acquirement in 2014, the Peshmerga found themselves fighting against this extremist group in contested areas with the Iraqi government, including the city of Kirkuk which has enormous historical value to the Kurdish people (Human Rights Watch, 2004). At the same time, the Kurds become an even more important ally for the international coalition to fight Daesh as they were seen as "potential game changers" in the political game map of the Middle East, since "non-state actors increasingly set the agenda, challenging governments, overthrowing them or prompting them to retrench behind increasingly repressive controls" (*The Economist*, as cited by Gunter, 2015). This prompted an increased confidence in the feasibilities of independence, considering the region's communications with Baghdad had become cut off due to the state of war.

Soon after liberating Kirkuk from ISIS's control, the KRG's executive office, marshalled by President Massoud Barzani, called for a referendum on June 2017 to be held in September of the same year, inciting opposition in Baghdad and the rest of the world. Soon after the referendum was held, over 90% of the Kurdish population voted for independence. Considering it an affront to the legitimacy of the Iraqi state, Baghdad enforced a flight ban on

the region, severely damaging its economic activities. At the same time, Turkey and Iran restricted their oil trade with the KRG (Dri, 2018).

The situation would later escalate into a near-military confrontation in Kirkuk in October, with the Peshmerga facing the Iraqi military in full force. Coalition reports stated that attacks did not take place, only “coordinated movements.” (Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, 2017). However, UN reports state that there were incidents of violence in cities of the governorate, such as Tuz Khurmatu, as well as a forced displacement of Kurds (UNAMI, 2017). Reuters estimated that about 100,000 Kurds fled before the Iraqi army reached Kirkuk (Reuters, 2017). Barzani would later step down, but not before accusing Peshmerga forces related to the PUK of intentionally sabotaging the country’s territorial integrity by not engaging in confrontation (Dri, 2018).

This ended up with the KRG losing almost half its territory, most specifically the gains it had made in the southernmost regions of Kirkuk, Duhok, and Sanjar. At the same time, it almost lost access to one of pipelines it uses to transport natural gas to Turkey. Punitive measures were taken by the Iraqi government on Kurds living in the disputed areas as well. To top it off, the international community gave the KRG cold shoulder for months before any other Head of State decided to receive the Kurdish Head of Government to discuss the sanctions and obstacles set after the referendum (Dri, 2018). The KRG would also go through tremendous political instability after this loss of territory, with disputes over naming a president and a prime minister spanning an entire year until Masrour Barzani was elected Prime Minister for the KRG and Nechirvan Barzani was unanimously nominated for President by the Kurdish parliament (Frantzman, 2018). This instability also showcased the intense lobbying that came from many foreign powers in the designation of the Kurdish polity (Al-Salhy, 2018).

### Resource Security in Kurdistan

Any aspirations for a Kurdish State had energy and resources at the heart of the problem, since it would be impossible for a *de jure* Kurdistan to exist without something to sustain it. For this, the KRG actually undertook numerous diplomatic processes with other States, MNCs, and even IGOs to give it legitimacy as a player in the world stage through “para-diplomacy.” Para-diplomacy is defined by Noé Carnago as “the activities of sub-state governments in international relations through ‘the establishment of formal and informal contacts, either permanent or ad hoc, with foreign public or private entities, with the aim to promote socio-economic, cultural or political issues.’” (Carnago, as cited by Zadeh and Kirmanj, 2017). It is due to this concept that the KRG actually held the most stable section in Iraq, with steady economic growth and optimism in security and other issues, as they made transformed it into a secure investment for oil companies such as ExxonMobil, Total, and Gazprom. In fact, this has been done without consulting Baghdad, further undermining its stature and territorial integrity (Zadeh and Kirmanj, 2017).

Therefore, many of the KRGs action have a direct repercussion on the oil market and interests. In fact, that is why the city of Kirkuk was so important for the KRG to maintain, as it produces 10% of the entire Iraqi oil barrel production (Mohtadi, 2017). As many U.S and European economic interests lay roots here, it is also why change in this region becomes increasingly more difficult and the attention being payed to the rest of the country more dwindled (Avraham, 2018). This also has made surrounding countries such as Iran and Turkey cuddle up to the KRG even more than to Baghdad, without renouncing their opposition to any sort of secession.

Iraqi Kurdistan is also one of the most important regions in the Middle East for water reserves and aquifers. This gives it huge leverage on Baghdad, as it could come to conflict over this precious resource. Climate change has made water scarcity a serious security issue in the

Middle East, to the point that wars and conflicts over water become ever more possible than confrontations over energy resources could be (DuBois King, 2018). In fact, a study showed that water has already been used as a weapon in Syria and Iraq 44 times from 2012 to 2016 alone (DuBois King, 2015). However, Erbil has no access to international water regimes, so it depends on Baghdad to receive support and regulate the precious resource, as well as to negotiate in its stead with neighboring countries that may need to settle the uses of the commons (DuBois King, 2018).

### *Bloc Perspectives*

The referendum received massive international opposition, from the UNSC by declaring it to have a “potentially destabilizing impact” while the fight against Daesh still raged on, to its staunch support in the U.S dwindled into a position of “not taking sides.” (UN, 2017) (Reuters, 2017).

#### **The Permanent Five**

The U.S, France, and the U.K strongly objected to the referendum and to any type of calls of secession that followed, with the U.S calling it “provocative” and joining Baghdad in its punitive measures (Reuters, 2017). However, many oil interests reside in the KRG, which must be taken into account should these countries attempt to make a resolution on energy resources and the commons based in the region. On the other hand, Russia remained silent on its criticism of the referendum as it signed a deal with the KRG worth over 1 billion USD for the Russian oil company Rosneft, making Russia the most important business partner of the Kurds in Iraq but still opposing its secession (Zhdannikov, 2017).

### **Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA)**

Historically, Middle Eastern countries have looked down or even ignored the Kurds in Iraq as either another minority or as a nuisance in the case of Turkey, Syria, and Iran. However, the KRGs drive to open its economy and attract investments has, in the words of a KRG representative, “replaced a military army...” with “an army of businessmen...” (Zadeh and Kirmanj, 2017). However, even though business activities are actively pursued, there is no clear foreign policy other than the absolute rejection for calls of independence, all the while weakening Baghdad’s hold on the region to facilitate trade.

The most curious case is the one of Israel, it being the only major country that has called for respect for the Kurds’ self-determination and drive to become independent. While it may sound surprising, it also respects Israel’s search for allies and buffer zones from Iran and Syria. Prime Minister Netanyahu actively lobbied other world leaders to defend the autonomous region’s territory from being diminished as the Battle of Kirkuk happened, calling it the loss of “a foothold... a strategic plate.” (Williams, 2017).

## *Questions to be Answered by the Committee*

1. One of the reasons for the Iraqi Kurds to desire their own state is because they feel separated and marginalized by the Arab Iraqis in Baghdad. Would a long term solution in the form of better integration of the Kurds into the Iraqi society, a better political representation in the state's government and policies that prevent marginalization of minorities have an effect after all that has transpired until now?
2. Is the Iraqi Kurdistan Question even an issue that should be addressed in the international community or is it a matter of Iraqi internal affairs? Should foreign actors such as the USA, Turkey, and Iran stop supporting different political groups in the state and leave it to resolve its own issues?
3. The issue of disputed areas has not yet been resolved. The opinions here are divided, yet the biggest problem remains the uncertainty about them being controlled either by Erbil or by Baghdad. How could that issue be resolved? Should they be a part of the Iraqi Kurdistan or be governed by Baghdad? Is there a third option?
4. After the 2005 Iraqi Constitutional Reform recognizing the Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous region, the office of President of Iraq is open solely for the Kurds to run. What does this say of the power dynamics in Iraq? Could the Kurds have even more influence in the country than they think?
5. What type of risks are posed to international security due to the relativeness of borders and territorial integrity in Iraq and Syria as of now? Does the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan share those concerns? Are they excluded from those protections? Why?

6. Turkey and other actors have been known to become patrons to questionable actors in order to follow their foreign policy regarding the Kurdish question. Does the UNSC have any role in to play with this knowledge? Is consensus on such a interest-driven region actually possible?
7. What is the importance of resource control, management, and regulation for regional security in the Middle East? How urgent must the UNSC act upon the commons of Kurdistan in order to prevent more conflicts from occurring?

## *Further reading*

- Stansfield, G. and Anderson, L. (2009). Kurds In Iraq: The Struggle between Baghdad and Erbil. *Middle East Policy* 16(1), 134–145.
- Abdulla, N., Barkey, H., Cook, S. A. And O’Sullivan, M. L. (b. d.). The Time of the Kurds. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessible at: <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/time-kurds#!/time-kurds>
- Jaffe, A. M. (2017). Unraveling the Oil Geopolitics Intertwined in the Kurdish Independence Referendum. *The Council on Foreign Relations*, 4 October. Accessible at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/unraveling-oil-geopolitics-intertwined-kurdishindependence-referendum>
- Sama, S. (2014). The proud neoliberalisation of Iraqi-Kurdistan. *Open Democracy*, 21 May. Accessible at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/schluwa-sama/proud-neoliberalisation-of-iraqikurdistan>
- Dri, Karwan Faidhi. (2018). “Kurdistan independence referendum: one year on.” Rudaw. Accessible at <http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/240920181>
- DuBois King, Marcus. (2018). “Hydropolitical Trends and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan.” Pacific Council on International Policy. 2 May. Accessible at: <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/hydropolitical-trends-and-future-iraqi-kurdistan>
- DuBois King, Marcus. (2015). “The Weaponization of Water in Iraq and Syria.” *The Washington Quarterly* 38 (4), pg. 153-169. DOI <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125835>
- Zadeh, Yoosef Abbas; Kirmanj, Sherko. (2017). *The Para-Diplomacy of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and the Kurdish Statehood Enterprise*. The Middle East Journal

Autumn 2017 71(4): 587 - 606.

doi:<http://dx.doi.org/millennium.itesm.mx/10.3751/71.4.14>

## Sources

---


1. Al-Salhy, Suadad. (2018). “Kurds split on next Iraqi president and throw government formation into further turmoil.” *Arab News*. Accessible at <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1377971/middle-east>
2. Avraham, Rachel. (2018). “Iraqi Kurdistan: From scorched land to role model.” The Hill. Accessible at <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/385418-iraqi-kurdistan-from-scorched-land-to-role-model>
3. Barkley, H. J. and Laipson, E. (2005). Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s Future. *Middle East Policy* 12(4). 66–76.
4. BBC. (2018). Iraqi Kurdistan Profile. *BBC News*, 25 April. Accessible at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263>
5. BBC. (2017a). Iraqi Kurds decisively back independence in referendum. *BBC News*, 27 September. Accessible at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41419633>
6. BBC. (2017a). Iraqi Kurdistan – Timeline. *BBC News*, 31 October. Accessible at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15467672>
7. Carnago, Noé. (2010). “On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy.” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 5(1-2): 11-36, as cited by Zadeh, Yoosef Abbas; Kirmanj, Sherko. (2017). *The Para-Diplomacy of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and the Kurdish Statehood Enterprise*. *The Middle East Journal* Autumn 2017 71(4): 587 – 606.  
doi:<http://0dx.doi.org.millenum.itesm.mx/10.3751/71.4.14>
8. “Coalition Statement on Military Movements near Kirkuk.” (2017). Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S Department of Defence. Accessible at

<http://www.inherentresolve.mil/News/News-Releases/Article/1343292/coalition-statement-on-military-movements-near-kirkuk/>

9. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (b. d.). Territorial Integrity. Accessible at: <https://www.csce.gov/issue/territorial-integrity>
10. DuBois King, Marcus. (2015). "The Weaponization of Water in Iraq and Syria." *The Washington Quarterly* 38 (4), pg. 153-169. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125835>
11. DuBois King, Marcus. (2018). "Hydropolitical Trends and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan." Pacific Council on International Policy. 2 May. Accessible at: <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/hydropolitical-trends-and-future-iraqi-kurdistan>
12. Frantzman, S. J. (2016). Kurdistan after Islamic State: Six Crises Facing the Kurds in Iraq. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 20(3). 12–18.
13. Frantzman, S.J. (2018). "Masrour Barzani set to be next Prime Minister of Kurdish region in Iraq." *The Jerusalem Post*. Accessible at <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Masrour-Barzani-set-to-be-next-Prime-Minister-of-Kurdish-region-in-Iraq-573406>
14. Gabbay, S. M. (2014). State borders vs. Cultural historical and religious social networks: The Case of Turkish Kurds', Kurds in Iraq - and their Struggle for Self-determination. *European Scientific Journal* 10(29), 10–33.
15. Gunter, M. M. (2004). The Kurds in Iraq. *Middle East Policy* 11(1). 106–131.
16. Gunter, M.M. (2015). "Iraq, Syria, ISIS, and the Kurds: Geostrategic Concerns for the U.S and Turkey." *Middle East Policy* 22(1). 102-111.
17. Gvosdev, N. (2017). Self-Determination versus State Integrity: Catalan and Kurdish Issues. *Ethics & International Affairs*, October. Accessible at:

- <https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/self-determination-versus-state-integrity-catalan-kurdish-issues/>
18. <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/1/self-determination-and-secession-under-international-law-cases-kurdistan>
  19. Human Rights Watch. (2004). *Iraq, Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq*. HRW. Page 54. Accessible at [https://books.google.com.mx/books?id=S36CEfg\\_hp4C&pg=PA54&redir\\_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com.mx/books?id=S36CEfg_hp4C&pg=PA54&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false)
  20. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – Representation in the United States. (b.d.). *Anfal Campaign and Kurdish Genocide*. Accessible at: <https://us.gov.krd/en/issues/anfal-campaign-and-kurdish-genocide/>
  21. Mohtadi, Alan. (2017). “Why Oil Markets are taking Kurdish Referendum in their stride.” *The Financial Times*. Accessible at <https://www.ft.com/content/d3da77a4-9fb1-11e7-8cd4-932067fbf946>
  22. Özpek, B. B. (2012). *Democracy or Partition: Future Scenarios for the Kurds of Iraq*. *Insight Turkey* 14(3), 127–140.
  23. Reuters. (2017). “About 100,000 Kurds have fled Kirkuk since Monday: Kurdish officials.” Reuters. Accessible at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-refugees/about-100000-kurds-have-fled-kirkuk-since-monday-kurdish-officials-idUSKBN1CO13D>
  24. Reuters. (2017). “U.S ‘not taking sides’ in Iraqi-Kurdish dispute – Trump.” Reuters. Accessible at <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-trump/u-s-not-taking-sides-in-iraqi-kurdish-dispute-trump-idUKKBN1CL2P6>

25. Sterio, M. 2017. Do Kurds Have the Right to Self-Determination and/or Secession?.  
Opinio Juris, 28. September. Accessible at:  
<http://opiniojuris.org/2017/09/28/kurds-right-self-determination-andor-secession/>.
26. UN. (2017). "Security Council Press Statement on Iraq". United Nations Organization.  
Accessible at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13002.doc.htm>
27. UNAMI. (2017). "UN Expresses Concern about Reports of Violence in Tuz Khurmatu,  
in Kirkuk." United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Public Information Office.  
Accessible  
at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PR%20Tuz%2019%20Oct%20EN.pdf>
28. UNSC. (b.d.a). What is the Security Council? Accessible at:  
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml>
29. UNSC. (b. d.b). Functions and Powers. Accessible at:  
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml>
30. Williams, Dan. (2017). "Netanyahu lobbies world powers to stem Iraqi Kurd setbacks."  
Reuters. Accesible at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-israel/netanyahu-lobbies-world-powers-to-stem-iraqi-kurd-setbacks-idUSKBN1CP181>
31. Zadeh, Yoosef Abbas; Kirmanj, Sherko. (2017). *The Para-Diplomacy of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and the Kurdish Statehood Enterprise*. The Middle East Journal  
Autumn 2017 71(4): 587 - 606.  
doi:<http://dx.doi.org.millenium.itesm.mx/10.3751/71.4.14>
32. Zhdannikov, Dmitry. (2017). "Russia becomes Iraq Kurds' top funder, quiet about  
independence vote." Reuters. Accessible at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-referendum-russi/russia-becomes-iraq-kurds-top-funder-quiet-about-independence-vote-idUSKCN1BV1IH>



# PragueMUN2019

©MUN Prague. 2019. All rights reserved.